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PRESS CONFERENCE BY
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SECRETARY OF STATE
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, I want to express my appreciation to Mr. Eagleburger for letting me get some words in before the press. He has done a distinguished job in the last few days. He has gotten his name too frequently into the newspapers, but we will take care of that later. (Laughter)

Ladies and gentlemen, let me explain first what we are trying to do; secondly, the evolution of these negotiations; and third, the various elements that have to be reconciled in these negotiations. And then I will take your questions.

The United States is making an effort to bring an end to the mounting crisis in southern Africa. The United States is conscious of the fact that an escalating guerrilla war is already taking place in Rhodesia, that conditions in Namibia will inevitably lead to a similar crisis. And, of course, we are also aware of conditions in South Africa. The United States is making a serious effort in order to see whether we can achieve the following objectives: majority rule and minority rights; a peaceful end to the disagreement; and negotiation that enables all of the communities to live side by side under conditions of dignity and progress. We do so in the interest of world peace, because continuing conflict in Africa will inevitably bring in the interests of outside powers and runs a major risk of turning Africa into an area of contention of non-African countries. We do so in the national interest of the United States, because of our interest. We have a profound interest in a world of peace, in a world that respects human dignity and in conditions of economic advance. And thirdly, and above all, we do it in the interest of the peoples of the area. They will be those who suffer most from a continuation of conflict. They will have to pay the price for any failure of negotiations. And they will have to be considered, as alternatives to peaceful resolution are being considered.

Now to the talks that have been taking place here in the last two days. The purpose of these talks has not been to develop a joint American-South African program. The evolution of these talks

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and what has brought us to this point is as follows:

On my visit to Africa in April, all African leaders urged a solution to the problems of southern Africa through quiet discussions with the Prime Minister of South Africa; that for many of these problems, the policies of his government held the key if a peaceful solution was to be achieved. Based on these views, we initiated contact with the Government of South Africa. Prior to my meeting with Prime Minister Vorster in Germany in June, we solicited the views of the black African governments as to the subjects to be discussed, and as to the conditions under which they believe a peaceful solution to the problems of southern Africa was achievable. We presented their considerations to the South African Prime Minister in June. Those discussions led to a certain amount of progress. After those discussions the United States sent two missions to the black African states. The United Kingdom, whose role is crucial in all of these actions, which has a historic responsibility for Rhodesia, and to whose cooperation and wisdom in this matter I would like to pay tribute, also sent two missions to Africa. On the basis of these two American and two British missions, a new set of considerations was developed which formed the basis for my discussions with the South African Prime Minister over the last two days. Those discussions have been fruitful. I believe that progress towards the objectives, which have been jointly developed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the states of black Africa, has been made. It is our view that a basis for further negotiations exists, though work still remains to be done. In assessing the prospects you have to keep in mind that we are dealing with a negotiation of extraordinary complexity in terms of the issues involved and in terms of the parties involved. In attempting mediation there is first of all the United States and the United Kingdom. We have worked together in close harmony and with no significant differences, but we have had to coordinate our positions and we have done so successfully. Within Africa we are dealing internationally now with two major problems -- the problem of Rhodesia and the problem of Namibia. They both have the same objectives; that is to say, independence, majority rule, minority rights, and assurances for economic progress. The United States and, I think I am safe in saying, the United Kingdom strongly support these objectives. But in achieving these objectives we are dealing with two different sets of parties in each case. The problem of Namibia is between South Africa, the various groups that have formed the constitutional conference within Namibia, and certain outside groups such as SWAPO, which had been excluded from the negotiations up to now, plus such neighboring states as Angola that has -- with which our communications are not, shall we say, ideal. With respect to Rhodesia, the problem is between four so-called front line states, that is states that are bordering Rhodesia -- four black states bordering Rhodesia; three independence movements; Rhodesian white authorities that are not recognized by either the United States or the United Kingdom, and South Africa, which does not recognize the

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Rhodesian authorities as a government, and which has given support to it in one way or another. In other words, we are dealing with two different problems, five states, four liberation movements in black Africa and South Africa, plus the authorities of Rhodesia and the authorities within Namibia. Nevertheless, with all of these complexities, and while we must expect ups and downs, I believe that conditions for a negotiation exist on both issues. The United States will work for the objectives that I have described. The United States is opposed to violence and the United States is opposed to outside intervention. The United States does believe that the objectives of majority rule, minority rights and economic progress for all the peoples of the area are attainable with patience, with good will and with dedication. And the United States is prepared together with the United Kingdom to offer its good offices in the attainment of these objectives. And now I will be glad to answer your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you say whether you made any progress here towards setting up a negotiating framework for resolving the Namibia question?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to say before I answer any questions that I hope you ladies and gentlemen will understand that at a time before we have had the opportunity to inform the leaders of black Africa of the details of the negotiations, something which we will do in the immediate future, you will understand that I cannot go into details on many of the questions that you may ask me. I believe -- just a minute, I have not answered him yet -- I believe that progress has been made towards setting up a negotiating framework but, of course, we will have to await also the reaction -- in Namibia, the reaction of other leaders.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did Prime Minister Vorster show any signs of a willingness to recognize SWAPO in Namibia?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the United States has stated that it favors the participation of all groups in negotiations and clearly we include SWAPO in this. It is, of course, up to the Prime Minister to speak for his position. But it is our view that a negotiating process will have to include such groups as SWAPO.

QUESTION: Sir, do you envisage the possibility of your meeting with Mr. Smith?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have no present plans to meet with Mr. Smith and this would depend entirely on assurance that a successful outcome of the negotiations will occur. But at this moment there are no plans to meet with Mr. Smith and there are no -- it would be totally premature to speculate on it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us if you had any communication with the leaders meeting in Dar es Salaam and what your plans are regarding your trip to Africa?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: There has been a meeting of the leaders in Dar es Salaam which only began a few hours ago. We have been in touch over the weekend with some of the leaders, but that was prior to their assembling. My own plans are to return to the United States tomorrow. I am ready to continue the negotiations in Africa if the parties should desire. We will communicate the results of these meetings to the parties, and we believe that conditions exist for the continuation of these negotiations.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, I have a question in two parts. A), have you been in contact with black African leaders in Rhodesia; and B), how do you see the prospects of bringing these black leaders of Rhodesia together?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On my trip to Africa in April, I agreed with the presidents of the so-called front line states, that is presidents that border the -- that border Rhodesia, that a repetition of Angola should be avoided. By this we mean that the outside powers, and especially the super-powers, should avoid direct contact with the so-called liberation movements; and to let the liberation movements be dealt with by the black African states. We, therefore, have been in only -- very infrequent contacts with the black leaders of Rhodesia, and we have always informed the leaders of black Africa of these contacts. We believe that the unification of this leadership is a task not for the United States, but is a task for black Africa. We hope very much that other outside powers exercise similar restraint.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you get an invitation to visit South Africa? Are you in favor of going there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Prime Minister Vorster did extend an invitation to visit South Africa. A visit by me to South Africa would depend on whether negotiations on the solution of problems to southern Africa are going forward. It would, in any event, be preceded by a visit to black Africa, and the program I would take to South Africa would reflect, as did all previous programs, the considerations of the black African leaders that I have met. In other words, a visit by me to South Africa would be in the interest of peace of southern Africa and would not be a protocol visit by a Secretary of State.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as you well know, many of the Africans have said that the time for talk is passed and the time is now for fighting. Beyond the general expression of views that you have given here as to the United States and British intentions, are you now in a position to propose specific financial, political and other suggestions that you have been able to agree with Prime Minister Vorster to the black leaders or were you essentially only holding open the possibility of good offices without any concrete offers?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are moving toward a position where we will be able to put to the leaders of black Africa a concrete program by which the objectives that I have described can be achieved for both Namibia and Rhodesia. We do not yet have all the details but we are moving in that direction. And the leaders of black Africa at that point will have to decide first whether the program meets those needs, which I would hope it does, and whether they are prepared to go the route of negotiations, or whether they prefer the route of armed struggle.

QUESTION: Just to follow that up, does that represent a joint US-South African position, or individual views which vary on the two subjects in some respect on Rhodesia and Namibia?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have pointed out that there is no joint US-South African position. The proposals we have put to South Africa have emerged from our discussions with the leaders of black Africa. Of course, those that are then accepted by South Africa would tend to create a consensus. And in any negotiation a point must be reached where all parties agree, if they are to succeed. But the proposals we have put forward had been developed first in consultation with the leaders of Africa, and are now being discussed with leaders of South Africa.

QUESTION: In case that the African summit in Tanzania decides on black rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, what will be your next step?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not want to speculate on decisions that the summit in Dar es Salaam may make. If it recommends a majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, the United States has already indicated its support for it. The issue is not what is the objective but how it is to be achieved--one, by what negotiating procedure, and second, under what concrete conditions. And there we have attempted to shape the proposals we have received from Africa and the views we have heard from South Africa into the program which we hope will be acceptable to all of the parties. But, of course, the solution can only come by the agreement of the parties concerned, and not by an imposition of the United States.

QUESTION: Does your program that you are drawing up involve changes in South Africa as well as Namibia?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The negotiations, the international negotiations at this moment concern Rhodesia and Namibia. The United States has stated its view with respect to South Africa last week and has had a response from South Africa as well.

QUESTION: Does South Africa (inaudible)?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. It has been publicly stated. And I am certain that the Prime Minister of South Africa will speak for himself when he meets the press.

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QUESTION: Has South Africa agreed to help finance any guarantees program in Rhodesia?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There has been an extraordinary amount of speculation about this so-called guarantees program. Our concern is not simply to deal with the minority -- with the white minority in Rhodesia; our concern is an economic program that brings about the economic advancement of all of Rhodesia, and within that context to provide opportunities for all races and all communities to live side by side with some security and with some assurances against rapid changes in their position. This program is still in a state of evolution and its details will have to await the precise discussions, though progress has been made in these and previous talks.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it has been reported this morning on the radio that if the Dar es Salaam people take the results of your talks quite well, it is thought that there may be a Namibia conference in Geneva quite shortly, by the beginning of October, say.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not want to go into specifics over negotiations that are still going on. But obviously, if independence for Namibia is to be achieved, there will have to be a conference. There has to be a location, and there will have to be an agreement as to participants. And you can safely assume that this is one of the subjects we are discussing right now. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you are to meet tomorrow President Giscard d'Estaing. Will you discuss with him about the selling to South Africa of its installations for treatment (inaudible)?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not commit suicide twice in a row. (Laughter) It's also physically impossible (laughter). And I will attempt to arrive in France for once without outraged statements in the French press. When I meet the President of France, my primary objective is to review with him the state of these negotiations, and the world situation, as we always do in a spirit of friendship and cooperation. I do not have on my agenda any specific French commercial transactions, but rather the general strategy that the United States and other countries are pursuing with respect to southern Africa, to get the benefits of the views of a leader whose opinion we value greatly and of whose friendship we are proud.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you used the term progress here and so did Mr. Vorster. Progress, of course, is a very rubbery term diplomatically. Is there any way under the limitations upon you, with your diplomatic requirements, that you can be in any way any more specific on any one of these spheres rather than telling us that progress has been made? Can you give us any kind of measurement or increment of progress?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Should I say progress is at hand?
(Laughter)

We change the noun every four years. I would say we have made progress both with respect to procedure and with respect to substance. I would want to repeat again that I measure this progress by the opinions we have previously collected from our various missions to Africa, and the objectives which we have stated for the United States and I believe for the United Kingdom. And we believe that progress is being made with respect both to the procedures and to the substance, though, of course, the many parties that I have described previously must make the final judgment on that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, when will the proposals you have outlined here be presented to the (inaudible)?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our tentative plan is to send Assistant Secretary Schaufele to Africa, but we may modify this. But this is our tentative plan and in any event, you can be sure that by one means or another they will be presented within the next forty-eight hours.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, before these negotiations started, before the talks here started, it was generally thought that the Namibian problem might be a little more tractable than the Rhodesian one. Is that still your view now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, anybody who makes estimates of the tractability of African problems is being very rash. I would think that the Namibian problem, having fewer parties, and being at an earlier phase in which procedure is as yet more dominant than substance, may lend itself to more rapid progress. I want to make clear that as far as the United States is concerned we are prepared to move at a pace as rapid as it is possible to achieve agreement among the parties on both of these issues.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how (inaudible) will the United Nations come into the negotiations?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the United Nations has, of course, a role in South-West Africa which some of its representatives carry out very vocally. There will be a role for the United Nations and this is one of the subjects that is now under discussion. But the United States supports a role for the United Nations in these negotiations. I will take one more question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how much further do you think your negotiations about Rhodesia can go on without contact or reference to what is the de facto government?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, somebody will have to be in contact with the authorities in Salisbury, and I believe that those possibilities of contact exist but it doesn't necessarily have to be the United States at this stage.

Thank you very much.

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